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Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to describe a new graphical structure called ÔBayesian causal mapsÕ to represent and
analyze domain knowledge of experts. A Bayesian causal map is a causal map, i.e., a network-based representation of
an expertÕs cognition. It is also a Bayesian network, i.e., a graphical representation of an expertÕs knowledge based on
probability theory. Bayesian causal maps enhance the capabilities of causal maps in many ways. We describe how the
textual analysis procedure for constructing causal maps can be modi®ed to construct Bayesian causal maps, and we
illustrate it using a causal map of a marketing expert in the context of a product development decision. Ó 2001 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Recently, there has been a growing interest in
the use of causal maps to represent domain
knowledge of decision-makers (Hu, 1990; Eden
et al., 1992; Laukkanen, 1996). Causal maps are
cognitive maps that represent the causal knowl-
edge of subjects in a speci®c domain. Causal maps
(also called cognitive maps, cause maps, etc.) have
been used extensively in the areas of policy anal-
ysis (Axelrod, 1976) and management sciences
(Klein and Cooper, 1982; Ross and Hall, 1980) to
represent salient factors, knowledge, and condi-
tions that in¯uence decision making.
In the last few years, researchers have empha-
sized that causal maps may be used as tools to
facilitate decision making and problem solving
within the context of organizational intervention
(Eden, 1992; Laukkanen, 1996). Studies in arti®-
cial intelligence have also emphasized the impor-
tance of domain knowledge in constructing
decision tools, especially in situations where do-
main knowledge is crucial and availability of data
is scarce (Heckerman, 1996). Since causal maps
represent domain knowledge more descriptively
than other models such as regression or structural
equations, they are more useful decision tools. An
important aspect of a decision model is the ability
to make inferences. Inference refers to drawing
conclusions based on a premise. To make an in-
ference is to come to believe a new fact based
on other information. Inference is important in
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decision analysis for two reasons. First, it allows
one to make predictions in case of interventions.
For example, a marketing manager may want to
know how a new marketing strategy will aect the
company pro®ts. Second, it provides a prescriptive
framework for decision making which can be
useful to individuals other than the expert in a
speci®c decision context.
Current techniques used to analyze causal maps
provide a qualitative interpretation of the vari-
ables representing a decision problem by focusing
on the structure of a causal map (Axelrod, 1976;
Bougon, 1992; Eden et al., 1979; Ross and Hall,
1980). This qualitative approach is useful in de-
scribing a decision problem or in making infer-
ences in case of very simple maps with few
variables. However, drawing inferences about
variables in complex causal maps may be a non-
trivial task because of two reasons. First, causal
maps do not model uncertainty associated with the
decision variables (Hu, 1990; Laukkanen, 1996).
All variables in the maps have the same level of
certainty. Identifying the level of uncertainty is
important in making inferences because observa-
tions of variables may be uncertain, information
may be incomplete, or the variables involved may
be vague. Second, causal maps provide a static
representation of the decision variables. They do
not depict how beliefs of decision-makers about
some target variables change when decision-mak-
ers learn additional information about relevant
situational factors or decision options represented
in the map. Such a dynamic approach is important
in not only drawing inferences but also in learning
about causal relations representing complex and
uncertain decisions (Heckerman, 1996).
Recent advances in arti®cial intelligence such as
Bayesian networks allow us to use causal maps to
make inferences for decision making. This study
uses the theory of Bayesian networks to suggest a
quantitative way to make inferences in causal
maps. A Bayesian network is a speci®cation of a
joint probability distribution of several variables in
terms of conditional distributions for each vari-
able. In general, the relations represented in a
Bayesian network do not have to be causal rela-
tions. However, a Bayesian network representa-
tion is sparse and ecient when the relations are
causal (Shachter and Heckerman, 1987), and
sparse Bayesian networks allow us to make infer-
ences eciently even when we have many variables
in the network (Pearl, 1986; Lauritzen and Spei-
gelhalter, 1988; Shenoy and Shafer, 1990). Baye-
sian networks in which the dependence relations
are causal are also called causal belief networks,
causal probabilistic networks, etc. We simply refer
to such representations as Bayesian causal maps.
Using the framework of Bayesian networks,
Bayesian causal maps can account for uncertainty
associated with the variables in the map. Bayesian
causal maps can use the evidence propagation al-
gorithms of Bayesian networks to analyze the
sensitivity of variables of interest (e.g. outcome
variables) to additional ®ndings about other vari-
ables (e.g. situational variables).
An outline of the remainder of the paper is as
follows. In Section 2, we discuss the de®nition and
analysis of causal maps. In Section 3, we discuss
Bayesian networks, their semantics, and the pro-
cess of making inferences. In Section 4, we propose
a procedure for constructing a Bayesian causal
map starting from a causal map. In Section 5, we
discuss a case study of product development de-
cision in a technology organization. Finally, in
Section 6, we conclude with a summary and a
statement of future research.
2. Causal maps
Causal maps are directed graphs that represent
the cause±eect relations embedded in managersÕ
thinking (Fiol and Hu, 1992). Eden et al. (1992)
de®nes a causal map as a ``directed graph char-
acterized by a hierarchical structure which is most
often in the form of a means/end graph.'' Causal
maps express the judgment that certain events or
actions will lead to particular outcomes. The three
components of a causal map are node representing
causal concept, link representing causal connection
among causal concepts (can be positive or nega-
tive), and strength representing causal value of a
causal connection. Fig. 1 depicts a causal map of a
marketing expert in the context of a new product
decision.
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This causal map consists of four causal con-
cepts: Market Dynamics, Product Life Cycle,
Market Leadership and Rate of Product Launch.
The causal concepts are linked to each other
through causal connections represented by unidi-
rectional arrows (either positive or negative). The
concept at the tail of an arrow is the ÔcauseÕ of the
concept at the head of the arrow. For example,
high market dynamics leads to a short product life
cycle (negative relation). A short product life cycle
causes the rate of product launch of a company to
be high (negative relation). Finally, market lead-
ership causes a company to launch products at a
high rate (i.e. a positive relation).
Causal maps make the following three as-
sumptions about cognition in the context of deci-
sion making (Hu, 1990).
1. Causal associations are a major way in which
decision problems can be described and under-
stood;
2. Causality is the primary form of post-hoc ex-
planation of decision outcomes; and
3. Choice among alternative decision actions in-
volves causal relations.
The primary emphasis in causal maps is in
identifying dependence between variables in terms
of explanation±consequence or means±end rela-
tionships. Dierent techniques have been em-
ployed to construct causal maps including
structured methods such as the self-Q method
(Bougon, 1983), open method based on personal
construct theory (Eden et al., 1979), and textual
analysis approach (Axelrod, 1976). We use the
textual analysis method for constructing Bayesian
causal map. The textual analysis method is deemed
appropriate because it does not require the re-
searcher to identify causal concepts prior to or
during the interview with subjects. The advantage
of this method is that it enables the researcher to
let the data drive the concepts rather than eliciting
an individualÕs cognition from a prede®ned set of
concepts (Carley and Palmquist, 1992). The unin-
trusive nature of this method is especially impor-
tant in representing an expertÕs description and
understanding of an unstructured decision prob-
lem.
Causal maps have been useful in practice. For
example, Axelrod (1976) describes a causal map
derived from text to represent a decision-makerÕs
beliefs concerning the relationships between fac-
tors in the public health system. Similarly, Swan
(1995) describes textually derived causal maps of
key managers to identify important factors aect-
ing the decision of implementing computer-aided
production management technologies in manu-
facturing ®rms. Such causal maps have also been
used to represent cause±eect beliefs of decision-
makers in strategic alliance decisions (Fiol, 1990),
and marketing distribution decisions (Laukkanen,
1996).
Eden and Jones (1980) point out that there is no
general approach to analyze causal maps. In gen-
eral, causal maps can be analyzed qualitatively or
quantitatively. EdenÕs causal mapping technique,
most widely applied to problem construction, is an
aid to de®ning the nature of policy problem. It
involves con¯icting and qualitative views of the
problem. This has been widely applied in strategic
management for organizations and is constantly
being developed (Eden, 1991; Eden, 1992; Eden
et al., 1992; Eden and Ackermann, 1993). Causal
maps can also be analyzed quantitatively using
dierent analytical tools. For example, quantita-
tive analysis could be used to explore the numeri-
cal implications of possible policy options based
on constructed causal maps. Quantitative analysis
provides an objective basis for assessments of
causal maps so that subjective biases in qualitative
analysis could be reduced.
Fig. 1. A causal map of a marketing expert for a New Product
Decision.
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Quantitative tools used to analyze causal maps
largely dier depending on the context of appli-
cation. Matrix algebra and network analytic
methods have been used to explore the structural
properties of causal maps (Axelrod, 1976; Bougon
et al., 1977; Eden et al., 1979). System dynamics
has been used to analyze causal maps from a dy-
namic perspective (Forrester, 1961; Wolstenholme
and Coyle, 1983). Chen et al. (1979) uses an un-
structured variation of causal maps to construct
decision trees. They use these decision trees for
decision analysis using probability assessments
and utility functions. More recently, Wang (1996)
describes a neural network model to compare the
dynamic properties of causal maps. In this study,
we use the probabilistic inference procedures of
Bayesian networks to make inferences about
variables in causal maps.
3. Bayesian networks
In this section, we brie¯y describe the semantics
of Bayesian networks and their use in making in-
ferences. A procedure for constructing a Bayesian
network starting from a causal map is described in
Section 4.
Bayesian networks have their roots in attempts
to represent expert knowledge in domains where
expert knowledge is uncertain, ambiguous, and/or
incomplete. Bayesian networks are based on
probability theory. A primer on Bayesian net-
works is found in Speigelhalter et al. (1993).
A Bayesian network model is represented at
two levels, qualitative and quantitative. At the
qualitative level, we have a directed acyclic graph
in which nodes represent variables and directed
arcs describe the conditional independence rela-
tions embedded in the model. Fig. 2 shows a
Bayesian network consisting of four discrete vari-
ables: Market Dynamics (D), Product Life Cycle
(C), Market Leadership (L), and Rate of Product
Launch (R). At the quantitative level, the depen-
dence relations are expressed in terms of condi-
tional probability distributions for each variable in
the network. Each variable X has a set of possible
values called its state space that consists of mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive values of the vari-
able. In Fig. 2, e.g., Market Dynamics has two
states: ÔhighÕ and ÔlowÕ; Market Leadership has two
Fig. 2. A Bayesian network with conditional probability tables.
482 S. Nadkarni, P.P. Shenoy / European Journal of Operational Research 128 (2001) 479±498
states: ÔleaderÕ and ÔfollowerÕ; Product Life Cycle
has two states: ÔshortÕ and ÔlongÕ; and Rate of
Product Launch has two states: ÔhighÕ and ÔlowÕ. If
there is an arc pointing from X to Y, we say X is a
parent of Y. For each variable, we need to specify a
table of conditional probability distributions, one
for each con®guration of states of its parents.
Fig. 2 shows these tables of conditional distribu-
tions ± P D; P CjD; P L, and P RjC; L.
3.1. Semantics
A fundamental assumption of a Bayesian net-
work is that when we multiply the conditionals for
each variable, we get the joint probability distri-
bution for all variables in the network. In Fig. 2,
e.g., we are assuming that
P D;C; L;R  P D 
 P CjD 
 P L

 P RjC; L;
where 
 denotes pointwise multiplication of ta-
bles. The rule of total probability tells us that
P D;C; L;R  P D 
 P CjD 
 P LjD;C

 P RjD;C; L:
Comparing the two, we notice that we are making
the following assumptions: P LjD;C  P L, i.e.,
L is independent of D and C; and P RjD; C; L 
P RjC; L, i.e., R is conditionally independent of D
given C and L.
Notice that we can read these conditional in-
dependence assumptions directly from the Baye-
sian network graph as follows. Suppose we pick a
sequence of the variables such that for all directed
arcs in the network, the variable at the tail of each
arc precedes the variable at the head of the arc in
the sequence. Since the directed graph is acyclic,
there always exists such a sequence. In Fig. 2, e.g.,
one such sequence is D C L R. Then, the condi-
tional independence assumptions can be stated as
follows. For each variable in the sequence, we are
assuming that it is conditionally independent of its
predecessors in the sequence given its parents. The
essential point here is that missing arcs (from a
node to its successors in the sequence) signify
conditional independence assumptions. Thus the
lack of an arc from D to L signi®es that L is in-
dependent of D; the lack of an arc from C to L
signi®es that L is independent of C; and the lack of
an arc from D to R signi®es that R is conditionally
independent of D given C and L.
In general, there may be several sequences
consistent with the arcs in a Bayesian network. In
such cases, the list of conditional independence
assumptions associated with each sequence can be
shown to be equivalent using the laws of condi-
tional independence (Dawid, 1979). Pearl (1988)
and Lauritzen et al. (1990) describe other equiva-
lent graphical methods for identifying conditional
independence assumptions embedded in a Baye-
sian network graph.
Unlike a causal map, the arcs in a Bayesian
network do not necessarily imply causality. The
(lack of) arcs represent conditional independence
assumptions. How are conditional independence
and causality related? Conditional independence
can be understood in terms of relevance. If Z is
conditionally independent of X given Y, then this
statement can be interpreted as follows. If the true
state of Y is known, then in assigning probabilities
to states of Z, the states of X are irrelevant. In
practice, the notion of direct causality is often used
to make judgments of conditional independence.
Consider a situation where X directly causes Y and
Y in turn directly causes Z, i.e., the causal eect of
X on Z is completely mediated by Y. Then it is
clear that although X is relevant to Z, if we know
the true state of Y, further knowledge of X is ir-
relevant (for assigning probabilities) to Z, i.e., Z is
conditionally independent of X given Y. This sit-
uation is represented by the Bayesian network
X ® Y ® Z in which there is no arc from X to Z.
As another example, consider the situation where
X directly causes Y and X also directly causes Z.
Although knowledge of Y is relevant to Z (if Y is
true then it is more likely that X is true which in
turn means that it is more likely that Z is true),
once we know the true state of X, then further
knowledge of Y is irrelevant to Z, i.e., Y is con-
ditionally independent of Z given X. This situation
is represented by the Bayesian network Z ¬ X ® Y
in which there is no arc from Y to Z or vice-versa.
Finally as a third example, consider the situation
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where X and Y are two independent direct causes
of Z, i.e., X and Y are unconditionally indepen-
dent. But if we learn something about the true
state of Z, then X and Y are no longer irrelevant to
each other (if Z is believed to be true and X is false,
then it is more likely that Y is true), i.e., Y is not
conditionally independent of X given Z. This sit-
uation is represented by the Bayesian net
X ® Z ¬ Y in which there is no arc from X to Y or
vice-versa.
3.2. Making inferences
Inference (also called probabilistic inference) in
a Bayesian network is based on the notion of evi-
dence propagation. Evidence propagation refers to
an ecient computation of marginal probabilities
of variables of interest, conditional on arbitrary
con®gurations of other variables, which constitute
the observed evidence (Speigelhalter et al., 1993).
Probabilistic inference refers to the process of
computing the posterior marginal probability dis-
tributions of a set of variables of interest after
obtaining some observations of other variables in
the model.
Once a Bayesian network is constructed, it can
be used to make inferences about the variables in
the model. The conditionals given in a Bayesian
network representation specify the prior joint dis-
tribution of the variables. If we observe (or learn
about) the values of some variables, then such
observations can be represented by tables where
we assign 1 for the observed values and 0 for the
unobserved values. Then the product of all tables
(conditionals and observations) gives the (unnor-
malized) posterior joint distribution of the vari-
ables. Thus, the joint distribution of variables
changes each time we learn new information about
the variables.
In theory, the posterior marginal probability of
a variable X, say P X , can be computed from the
joint probability by summing out all other vari-
ables except X one by one. In practice, such a naive
approach is not computationally tractable when
we have a large number of variables because the
joint distribution has an exponential number of
states and values. The key to ecient inference lies
in the concept of local computation where we
compute the marginal of the joint without actu-
ally computing the joint distribution. A crucial
feature of a Bayesian network is that it describes
a joint distribution as built out of local relation-
ships within groups of variables ± such as a node
and its parents. Instead of tackling the whole
collection of variables simultaneously, we can use
the concept of factorization. Factorization in-
volves breaking down the joint probability dis-
tributions into subgroups called factors or belief
universes in such a way that the naive computa-
tions described above need only be performed
within each belief universe. Since the state space
of such belief universes is much smaller than that
of the joint probability distribution, the calcula-
tions become manageable.
To ensure that we obtain the correct answers
when considering all the variables together, we
need to develop ways for the belief universes to
communicate with each other, so that (for exam-
ple) the eect of conditioning on a variable in one
belief universe can be felt by those in another. This
is called the procedure of evidence propagation,
i.e., how information propagates between the dif-
ferent variables in the Bayesian network. Several
propagation architectures have been developed
which provide dierent algorithms to pass mes-
sages between the belief universes. Pearl (1986)
developed a message-passing scheme that updates
the probability distributions for each node in re-
sponse to observations of one or more variables.
Lauritzen and Speigelhalter (1988), Jensen et al.
(1990) and Shenoy and Shafer (1990) devised
propagation algorithms that ®rst transforms the
Bayesian network into a tree where each node in
the tree corresponds to a belief universe. The al-
gorithm then exploits several mathematical prop-
erties of this tree to perform probabilistic
inference.
These propagation algorithms can be used to
make two types of inferences. Often we are inter-
ested in the values of some target variables. In this
case, we make inference by computing the mar-
ginal of the posterior joint distribution for the
variables of interest. Consider the situation de-
scribed by the Bayesian network in Fig. 2. Suppose
we are interested in the true state of Rate of
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Product Launch (R). Given the prior model (as
per the probability tables shown in Fig. 2), the
marginal distribution of R is 0.71 for high and
0.29 for low. Now suppose we learn that Market
Dynamics is low. The posterior marginal distri-
bution of R changes to 0.52 for high and 0.48 for
low. Suppose we further learn that the state of
Market Leadership is follower. Then the marginal
distribution of R changes to 0.34 for high and
0.66 for low. This type of inference is referred to
as Ôsum propagationÕ.
Sometimes we are more interested in the con-
®guration of all variables (``the big picture'') rather
than the values of individual variables. In this case,
we can make inferences by computing the mode of
the posterior joint distribution, i.e., a con®gura-
tion of variables that has the maximum probabil-
ity. Consider again the situation described by the
Bayesian network in Fig. 2. Given the prior model
(as per the probability tables shown in Fig. 2), the
mode of the prior joint distribution is (high market
dynamics, leader, short product life cycle, high rate
of product launch). Now suppose we learn that
Market Dynamics is low. The mode of the poste-
rior joint distribution changes to (low market dy-
namics, leader, long product life cycle, high/low
rate of product launch) (both con®gurations have
the same maximum probability). Suppose we fur-
ther learn that the state of Market Leadership is
follower. Then the mode of the joint distribution
changes to (low market dynamics, leader, long
product life cycle, low rate of product launch).
This type of inference is referred to as Ômax prop-
agationÕ.
The results of inference are more sensitive to
the qualitative structure of the Bayesian network
than the numerical probabilities (Darwiche and
Goldszmidt, 1994). For decision making, the in-
ference results are robust with respect to the nu-
merical probabilities (Henrion et al., 1994).
There are several commercial software tools
such as Hugin [www.hugin.com] and Netica
[www.norsys.com] that automate the process of
inference. These tools allow the user to enter the
Bayesian network structure graphically, enter the
numerical details, and then do inference of either
type. The results of the inference are then shown
graphically using bar charts.
4. Constructing Bayesian causal maps
In this section, we sketch a procedure for con-
structing Bayesian causal maps starting from a
causal map based on concepts from Bayesian
networks and causal maps. The procedure for
constructing Bayesian causal maps proceeds in
two stages: qualitative and probabilistic.
4.1. Qualitative stage
In this stage, the structure of the causal maps is
modi®ed for two reasons. First, to eliminate some
of the limitations of the modeling procedure used
in the derivation of causal maps. Second, to make
the causal maps compatible with the Bayesian
network approach. In the qualitative stage, we
address four major modeling issues. These issues
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.1.1. Conditional independencies
A network model can be either a dependence
map (D-map) or an independence map (I-map)
(Pearl, 1988). A D-map guarantees that vertices
(concepts) found to be connected are indeed de-
pendent; however, it may display a pair of de-
pendent concepts as a pair of separated vertices
(concepts). An I-map, on the other hand, guar-
antees that vertices (concepts) found to be sepa-
rated are indeed conditionally independent, given
other variables. However, it may display a pair of
independent concepts as connected vertices (con-
cepts). A model that is both a D-map and an
I-map is called a perfect map.
A causal map is a directed graph that depicts
causality between variables as perceived by indi-
viduals. Since an arrow between two variables
implies dependence, it is a D-map. The absence of
an arrow between two variables does not imply a
lack of dependence. In other words, a causal map
does not guarantee that variables found to be
separated correspond to independent concepts,
i.e., it is not an I-map.
Bayesian networks, on the other hand, are
I-maps. Given a sequence of variables, an absence
of arrow from a variable to its successors in the se-
quence implies conditional independence between
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the variables. Conditional independence is an im-
portant issue in making inferences since it speci®es
the relevance of information on one variable in
making inference on another. Thus if we are to
regard a causal map as a Bayesian network, it is
important to ®rst convert the causal map model
from a D-map to an I-map. This can be done in
consultation with the expert (whose causal map is
at issue) by ensuring that all dependencies are de-
picted in the causal map. An adjacency matrix can
be used to achieve this. An adjacency matrix is the
matrix of all possible direct cause±eect relations
among the variables where the i; j entry indicates
the existence of a direct causality relation from
variable i to variable j (Axelrod, 1976). The adja-
cency matrix is represented as an n by n matrix in
which the columns and rows are labeled with the
names of the variables. The rows represent causes
and columns represent eects. For each pair of
variables, the subject (whose causal map is at is-
sue) is asked to specify if there is a causal relation
(scored initially as 1 for yes, and 0 for no) and if
yes, to specify which is the cause and which is the
eect. Subject should be instructed that if (s)he
considers the two variables to have reciprocal in-
¯uences, (s)he should indicate which one has the
more dominant causal in¯uence (to eliminate the
occurrence of direct reciprocal causality wherein a
variable is both a direct cause and an eect of
another variable). Once the subject has identi®ed
the existence of a causal relation, (s)he can then be
asked to indicate nature of the relation (positive or
negative). Thus when the subject is ®nished, each
cell in the adjacency matrix will have one of the
three values: )1 for a negative causal relation, 0
for no causal relation, or +1 for a positive causal
relation.
Fig. 3 indicates a part of a Bayesian causal map
of a marketing expert relating to a product de-
velopment decision. The solid arrow (from Prod-
uct Life Cycle to Rate of Product Launch) was
identi®ed in the original causal map. The dashed
arrows (from Market Dynamics to Product Life
Cycle, from Market Dynamics to Sales Uncer-
tainty, from Market Share Distribution to Sales
Uncertainty, from Sales Uncertainty to Product
Risk, and from Competition Strategy to Price
Level) were identi®ed in the process of making the
original causal map an I-map. These unmodeled
dependencies aect the inferences made on vari-
ables ± Sales Uncertainty, Product Risk and Price
Level. In the original causal map, inference on
Sales Uncertainty is not conditional on any other
variables in the map. For example, Market dy-
namics and Market Share Distribution are not
relevant in making inference on Sales Uncertainty.
However, in the modi®ed causal map, inference on
Sales Uncertainty is conditional on Market Share
Distribution as well as Market Dynamics. This
example illustrates how unmodeled dependencies
can change the inferences that can be made on the
various variables in the causal maps.
After incorporating all possible dependencies
between variables, the revised causal map is a
perfect map ± a D-map as well as an I-map. 1 An
arrow between two variables in the map implies a
causal relation between them; whereas missing
arrows imply conditional independence.
4.1.2. Reasoning underlying cause±eect relations
Causal maps identify individualsÕ perceptions of
cause±eect relationships between variables based
on language rather than the reasoning processes
(Carley and Palmquist, 1992). Studies in manage-
rial cognition indicate that individuals reason by
accumulating possibly signi®cant pieces of infor-
Fig. 3. Making a causal map a perfect map.
1 If we start with an arbitrary probability distribution, it is
not always possible to ®nd a Bayesian network representation
that is a perfect map (Pearl, 1988). Our starting point is an
expertÕs causal model and we are assuming that we can always
®nd a Bayesian network representation that is a perfect map.
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mation and organizing them in relation to each
other so as to be able to combine them into a
conclusion and decision (Jaques and Clement,
1996). Individuals use such reasoning processes to
put information together as a cause±eect series of
events leading to predicted future courses of
events. These reasoning processes are important in
decision making and in making inferences about
future decision outcomes.
Literature on logic suggests that individuals
perceive cause±eect relationships based on two
types of reasoning: deductive and abductive
(Charniak and McDermott, 1985; Winston, 1984).
A reasoning process is called deductive when we
reason from causes to eects, i.e., in the direction
of causation. For example, in the medical domain,
risk factors (e.g., smoking) are regarded as causes,
and the diseases (e.g., lung cancer) as eects. When
a physician, confronted with a patient who has
been a smoker, reasons that the patient is at risk
for lung cancer, (s)he is reasoning deductively.
A reasoning process is called abductive when
we reason from eects to causes, i.e., in the di-
rection opposite to causation. For example, dis-
eases (e.g., lung cancer) are regarded as causes of
symptoms (e.g., positive X-ray). When a physician,
after observing a patientÕs positive X-ray result,
concludes that the patient is probably suering
from lung cancer, (s)he is reasoning abductively.
The dierence between deductive and abductive
reasoning underlying causal statements and their
eect on representation of causal linkages are il-
lustrated in Fig. 4. Causal statement 1 involves the
use of logical deduction and the reasoning is in the
direction of causation. This is correctly re¯ected in
the arc from Product Risk to Sales Projection.
Causal statement 2 involves abductive reasoning.
Since Product Risk is a latent variable, and Sales
Projection is one of the observable measures of
Product Risk, the decision maker is making in-
ference about the latent variable Product Risk
based on the observable variable Sales Projection.
This does not imply that Sales Projection causes
Product Risk. The reasoning in this causal state-
ment is in the direction opposite of causation.
Causal statements involving abductive reasoning
are misrepresented in a causal map by an arc from
eect to cause. Such misrepresentation can also
lead to redundant circular relations between vari-
ables in the causal map. For instance, both the
arrows in Fig. 4 may be represented in a causal
map creating a loop.
A distinction between deductive and abductive
reasoning behind the causal linkages is essential
to establish accurate directions of linkages in
causal maps. The emphasis in deriving causal
maps should be on the causal theory underlying
the causal statements rather than the language
used.
4.1.3. Distinguishing between direct and indirect
relationships
The procedure for deriving causal maps does
not provide for a distinction between ÔdirectÕ and
ÔindirectÕ relationships between concepts (Eden
et al., 1992; Laukkanen, 1996). This distinction is
important to identify conditional independencies
in the causal maps. Fig. 5 depicts how a lack of
distinction between direct and indirect relationship
aects conditional independence assumptions in a
Fig. 4. Distinguishing between deductive and abductive rea-
soning. Fig. 5. Distinguishing between direct and indirect relations.
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causal map. In Fig. 5, both Product Risk and Sales
Projection directly in¯uence Product Decision. In
the modi®ed Bayesian causal map, there is no
linkage between product risk and product decision
implying that product risk impacts product deci-
sion strictly through Sales Projection. If we have
complete information on Sales Projection, any
additional information on Product Risk would be
irrelevant in making inferences about Product
Decision.
A clear distinction between direct and indirect
cause±eect relations is important for three rea-
sons. First, it helps us understand the nature of
relations between variables. It tells us whether the
eect of a variable on another is completely
modeled by the eect of the ®rst on a third medi-
ating variable (which in turn is a cause of the
second). Second, if Product Risk (in Fig. 5) aects
Product Decision only through Sales Projection
Figures, then an arrow from product risk to
product decision is redundant and increases the
complexity of the representation. Finally, distinc-
tion between direct and indirect cause±eect rela-
tions allows incorporation of conditional
independencies in causal maps. As we have seen
earlier, conditional independencies are critical in
making inferences on the variables in large causal
maps.
4.1.4. Eliminating circular relations
Causal maps are directed graphs and are char-
acterized by a hierarchical (or acyclic) structure.
However, circular relations or causal loops destroy
the hierarchical form of a graph. Circular relations
in the causal maps violate the acyclic graphical
structure required in a Bayesian network. It is
therefore essential to eliminate circular relations to
make causal maps compatible with Bayesian net-
works. Causal loops can exist for two reasons
(Eden et al., 1992; Hu, 1990; Laukkanen, 1996).
First, they may be coding mistakes that need to be
corrected. Second, they may represent dynamic
relations between variables across multiple time
frames.
Coding mistakes can be recti®ed by clarifying
causal linkages between variables in terms of
deductive versus abductive reasoning or direct
versus indirect linkage; issues already discussed
in previous paragraphs. However, if causal loops
exist despite these clari®cations, then they can be
eliminated by aggregating the variables into a
single variable. In causal maps, causal assertions
of individuals are aggregated (or clustered) into
broader concepts. All variables or nodes in cir-
cular relations are of the same hierarchical status
and so if aggregated to a single node, the gen-
eral form of the causal map can still be hierar-
chical.
In addition to coding mistakes, feedback loops
may indicate dynamic relations between variables
overtime. In such cases, part of the linkages in the
loop pertains to a current time frame and some
linkages pertain to a future time frame. In such
cases, deaggregating the variables into two time
frames can often solve the problem of circularity.
For example, Fig. 6 shows a reciprocal causal
relation between Market Leadership and Rate of
Product Launch and reasoning underlying this
circular relation. Arrow t1 implies that companies
having market leadership tend to introduce more
products that are new. Arrow t2 implies that in-
troduction of new products aects the Market
Leadership of the ®rm at some future point in
time. The circular relation has resulted from ag-
gregation of the variable Market Leadership
across two time frames: t1 and t2. After de-ag-
gregating Market Leadership into two time
frames, we get an acyclic relation between the
three variables. To make the causal map acyclic,
we arbitrarily retain one of the two relations and
exclude the other from the causal map. An acyclic
structure of the causal map is essential to the
inference process and to make causal maps com-
patible with Bayesian networks. Bayesian net-
works are unable to represent reciprocal causal
relations.
Fig. 6. Deaggregating variables over time.
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4.2. Probabilistic stage
In this stage, the numerical parameters of the
Bayesian causal map are assessed. Also, the causal
Bayesian map is validated using validation proce-
dures.
4.2.1. Assessment of numerical parameters
The parameters of the causal map consist of the
strength of the linkages between the dierent
variables. However, in the context of inference, we
are interested in the uncertainty associated with
every variable in the map and the interactive eects
of multiple causal variables on eect variables. The
Bayesian network approach provides tools to ad-
dress both of these issues in de®ning the parame-
ters of the map. Major issues in the derivation of
the parameters of the causal map are discussed in
the following sections.
One of the most challenging problems in
generating a causal map is specifying the strength
associated with the causal connections in the
map. Traditional analytical methods to represent
the parameters of the causal maps are based on
social network methods (Knoke and Kuklinski,
1982). The parameters of a causal map constitute
the strength of each pairwise linkage in the map
and are measured in terms of the frequency of
the linkage in the narrative. This measure has
been criticized by researchers for several reasons
(Hu, 1990; Laukkanen, 1996). First, it does not
explicitly incorporate an individualÕs perception
of the strength associated with a linkage in the
causal map. A number of factors such as the type
of interview (structured versus unstructured),
length of the narrative (either interview of ar-
chival data), etc., can aect the frequency with
which concepts and linkages are mentioned in the
map. Second, the strength of the causal connec-
tion is based on pairwise comparison of each
causal variable independently on the eect vari-
able. It does not capture the interactive eects of
causal variables on the eect variables. Finally,
the uncertainty associated with each variable in
the map is not represented in the frequency
measure. All variables are assumed to have the
same level of uncertainty.
Treatment of uncertainty is necessary in causal
maps because there are dierent sources of un-
certainty in a decision problem. The observations
may be uncertain, the information about variables
in the map may be incomplete, the relations in the
domain represented by the map may be of a non-
deterministic type, or the variables involved may
be vague. One common way of capturing uncer-
tainty of the variables in a Bayesian network is to
measure a personÕs Ôdegree of beliefÕ for that vari-
able conditional on the states of its parents. This
uncertainty associated with the variables in a de-
cision model is sensitive to the context in which the
certainties have been established. The process of
measuring degrees of belief is commonly referred
to as probability assessment or probability encoding
procedure.
Many dierent probability encoding techniques
are available (for a detailed review see (Spetzler
and Stael von Holstein, 1975)) wherein a subject
responds to a set of questions either directly by
providing numbers or indirectly by choosing be-
tween simple alternatives or bets. The choice of
response mode (direct or indirect) as well as the
choice of a method within each mode depends on
the preferences of the subject. Spetzler and Stael
von Holstein (1975) describe three direct response
encoding methods ± cumulative probability, frac-
tiles and verbal encoding ± to elicit probabilities.
In the cumulative probability method, the subject
is asked to assign the cumulative probability as-
sociated with a variable conditioned ton the states
of its parent variables. The probability response
can be expressed either as an absolute number
(0.30), as a discrete scale (``three on a scale from
zero to ten''), or as a fraction using a discrete scale
(``three in ten''). Verbal encoding uses verbal de-
scriptions to characterize events in the ®rst phase
of the encoding procedure. The descriptors used
are those to which the subject is accustomed to
such as ``high'', ``medium'' or ``low''. The quanti-
tative interpretation of the descriptors is then en-
coded in a second phase. The form chosen to
express the probability (absolute number, per-
centage, fraction or verbal) should be the one most
familiar to the subject.
When a variable has many parents, the num-
ber of probability assessments can be reduced by
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assessing the nature of the relationship between
the variable and its parents such as noisy-OR,
noisy-AND, etc. (Henrion, 1989; Pradhan et al.,
1994). Once the parameters of the causal map are
identi®ed, propagation algorithms can be used to
make inferences about the variables in the causal
maps.
4.2.2. Validation
We propose validation procedures for both
qualitative and quantitative stages of constructing
Bayesian causal maps. In the qualitative stage, we
extend the reliability and validity techniques
suggested by causal mapping studies (Axelrod,
1976; Carley, 1997; Eden et al., 1992; Hu, 1990)
to the modi®cation procedures proposed in our
study. A typical method used to establish reli-
ability of the cognitive mapping procedure is to
achieve a consensus among multiple raters for all
the stages of the cognitive mapping procedure.
Accordingly, the modi®cations to the original
causal map (described in Section 4.1) can be
made through a consensus between multiple rat-
ers. For example, modi®cations agreed to by two
or more raters can be retained, whereas those for
which agreement cannot be reached can be
thrown out. Such inter-rater reliability also re-
duces the possibility that researchersÕ own inter-
pretations have contaminated the modi®cation
process.
Validation of Bayesian causal maps involve
establishing that the modi®cations made to the
original causal map measure what they are in-
tended to measure. This validation has to be es-
tablished at the qualitative level as well as the
quantitative level. Typical practice suggests that
researchers check the interpretation of variables in
a causal map with the subjects involved. This can
be extended to the modi®cation procedure in the
qualitative phase wherein modi®cations can be
made to the original causal maps after consulta-
tion with the subjects involved.
At the quantitative level, sensitivity analysis
approach from operations research can be used to
validate the map (Churchman et al., 1957; Howard
and Matheson, 1981). Sensitivity analysis consists
of examining the posterior marginals of decision
variables under dierent scenarios and then cor-
roborating these marginals with the domain ex-
pert. The sensitivity analysis procedure is
illustrated in the next section in the context of a
case study.
Bayesian causal maps combine the strengths of
causal maps and Bayesian networks and reduce
the limitations of either. A comparison of the three
network models is shown in Table 1.
Table 1
A comparison of causal maps, Bayesian networks and Bayesian causal maps
Features Causal map Bayesian network Bayesian causal map
Graphical structure:
1. Type of network model Dependence map Independence Map Perfect map
2. Type of graph Directed graph Directed acyclic graph Directed acyclic graph
3. De®nition of relations Based on causality Based on conditional
independence
Based on causality and
conditional independence
Model parameters:
4 .Uncertainty of variables Not represented Represented Represented
5. Background noise or
unmodeled factors
Not represented Represented Represented
6. Interactive eects of multiple
causal variables on eect variables
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5. A case study: Product development decision
This section describes a case study of a con-
struction of a Bayesian causal map. The main goal
of the case study is to provide a test bed for
the construction of a Bayesian causal map using the
technique described in the previous section. The
case study is also useful for illustration purposes.
We describe how starting from a causal map, we
construct the qualitative structure of a Bayesian
causal map. We show how additional information
can be collected from a subject to address the
modeling issues discussed in Section 4.1 as well as
to derive the numerical parameters of the Bayesian
causal map. In addition, we describe how Bayesian
network software can be used to draw probabi-
listic inferences in a Bayesian causal map.
Decision context. We used a modi®ed version of
the New Product Decision case (Clemen, 1996)
from decision analysis literature as a decision
context. We chose this case because it was su-
ciently unstructured to allow an expert to develop
his/her own framework in diagnosis, analyses, and
recommendations of decision options. Also, the
decision alternatives, outcomes, and situational
factors all involved uncertainty.
The decision scenario presented in the case is as
follows. A marketing executive of a computer-
manufacturing ®rm is faced with a decision of in-
troducing a new computer model. There are three
dierent options. The ®rst option is to continue
with the existing product line that is essentially a
risk-free proposition with stable expected pro®ts.
The second option, which is riskier than the ®rst,
involves introducing a modi®ed version of the ex-
isting model. This option involves signi®cant ini-
tial investment and very little information is
available on sales predictions. However, a working
prototype of the modi®ed product has already
been developed and pricing decisions have been
made. In other words, it is ready to be produced
and marketed. Moreover, this product, if success-
fully marketed, has the potential of yielding pro®ts
much higher than the ®rst product. The third op-
tion, which is riskier than the second, consists of
introducing a product that has not yet been fully
developed. The prototype developed has some
problems, and the engineering division has indi-
cated its con®dence in solving the problems, but
there is a slight chance that devising a workable
solution may take a much longer than predicted
resulting in a signi®cant delay in introducing this
modi®ed product. The best case pro®t scenario for
the third option is much higher than the second.
Subject. The subject was a marketing professor
whose prior work experience and current line of
research was relevant to the decision context.
Data collection. The subject was given the de-
cision case a week before the interview. An inten-
sive interview (two to three hours) was conducted
with the subject to elicit his/her analysis of the case
and decision recommendations. The subject was
asked to identify factors that he/she would con-
sider as the marketing executive responsible for the
new product decision. The subject was encouraged
to identify factors not identi®ed in the decision
scenario that, in his/her opinion, might be relevant
to the decision. The narrative yielded by this in-
terview was used to construct the original causal
map shown in Fig. 7 below using a textual analysis
method (for details see Carley and Palmquist,
1992; Eden et al., 1979; Hu, 1990; Laukkanen,
1996). Follow-up interviews were conducted with
the subject to modify the structure of the causal
map to construct the qualitative structure of the
Bayesian causal map. The next few paragraphs
discuss this procedure in detail.
Causal map. The original causal map shown in
Fig. 7 describes the subjectÕs causal perceptions of
the decision problem in the new product decision
case. There are 18 variables in the map represent-
ing industry factors, ®rm factors, product charac-
teristics, and decision options. The three major
industry factors are Market Dynamics, Product
Life Cycle, and Market Share Distribution. Firm
factors represent the prior market experience of
the ®rm and long term strategies of the ®rm and
include Competitive Strategy, Brand Loyalty,
Market Leadership, Cross-Functional Teams,
R&D, Rate of Product Launch and Prior Presence
(in the market). The product characteristics are
represented by Sales Uncertainty, Production De-
lay, Initial Investment, Product Risk, and Sales
Projection. The three decisions the manager has to
make in this speci®c decision context are Willing-
ness to Take Risk, Product Pricing, and Product
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Decision. The manager has to evaluate each of the
three products options in terms of go/no go deci-
sion.
Constructing a Bayesian causal map. The causal
map in Fig. 7 was used to construct a Bayesian
causal map. The procedure proceeded in two
stages: qualitative and probabilistic.
In the qualitative stage, we conducted two fol-
low-up interviews to address the four modeling
issues discussed in Section 4.1. In the ®rst follow-
up interview, the subject was provided with the
original causal map and was requested to provide
clari®cations of the cause±eect relations in the
map based on the following four instructions.
1. Direct causality between variables. The sub-
ject was instructed that an arrow between two
variables in the map should represent a direct
cause±eect relationship only. This resulted in
three major changes in the linkages in the original
map. First, in the original causal map, Competitive
Strategy leads to Sales Projection as well as
Product Decision. However, in the modi®ed causal
map, Competitive Strategy does not have a direct
eect on either Sales Projection or Product Deci-
sion. Competitive Strategy has a direct aect on
Product Pricing, which aects Sales Projection.
Sales Projection, in turn, aects Product Decision.
In other words, an indirect relationship between
Competitive Strategy, Sales Projection and Prod-
uct Decision was depicted as a direct relationship
in the original causal map. Second, the original
causal map shows a direct causal relation between
Product Risk and Product Decision. However, in
the modi®ed causal map, Product Risk aects
Sales Projection, which in turn aects Product
Decision. The indirect relation between Product
Risk and Product Decision was shown as a direct
relation in the original map. Finally, Market
Leadership and Product Decision were directly
related in the original map. In the modi®ed causal
map, Market Leadership directly aects Willing-
ness to Take Risk, which in turn directly aects
Product Decision. The linkages in the modi®ed
causal map depict only direct relations between
variables.
2. Conditional independence. The subject was
instructed that an absence of an arrow between
two variables in the map should represent a lack of
Fig. 7. The original causal map of a marketing expert for the product development decision.
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dependence between the two variables. This re-
sulted in ®ve additional links in the modi®ed map.
First is the link between Market Dynamics and
Product Life Cycle that did not exist in the original
causal map. Second is the link between Market
Dynamics and Sales Uncertainty. These variables
were shown as conditionally independent in the
original map. Similarly, the modi®ed map shows
links between Market Share Distribution and Sales
Uncertainty, Market Share Distribution and Sales
Uncertainty, and Market Share Distribution and
Prior Presence that did not exist in the original
causal map.
3. Deductive reasoning. The subject was in-
structed that an arrow should be directed from
cause to eect only (deductive reasoning). The
original map shows a link from Sales Projection to
Product Risk. However, as shown in Fig. 4, the
direction of the arrow is based on abductive rea-
soning from the observable measure (Sales Pro-
jection) to the latent cause (Product Risk). The
direction of this arrow changed in the modi®ed
causal map from Product Risk to Sales Projection.
4. Similar time frames. The subject was in-
structed that all variables should pertain to a
speci®c time frame t1. We de®ned t1 as the period
until the ®nal decision of marketing the new
product was reached (to eliminate circular rela-
tions due to relations pertaining to dierent peri-
ods). This resulted in the elimination of a
reciprocal relationship between Market Leader-
ship and Rate of Product Launch shown in Fig. 6.
At the end of the ®rst interview, the subject was
asked to provide a brief rationale or explanation
for every link added or deleted in the original
causal map. This explanation provided a validity
check for modi®cations made to the map. Based
on the suggestions made and the explanation
provided by the subject, two raters (one researcher
and another marketing expert) modi®ed the orig-
inal causal map through consensus. Modi®cations
agreed to by both the raters were made to the
original causal map, and those not agreed to were
excluded.
A second follow-up interview was conducted to
validate the modi®cation process. Accordingly, the
subject was provided with a modi®ed causal map
(based on the information collected in the ®rst
follow-up interview) to check if the modi®ed map
correctly re¯ected the modi®cations made to the
original map. The ®nal modi®cations were made
to the map through close consultations with the
subject. The resultant structure of the Bayesian
causal map is shown in Fig. 8.
In the probabilistic stage, the parameters of the
model were assessed. The parameters of a Baye-
sian causal map consist of marginal probabilities
and conditional probabilities. To assess the mar-
ginal probabilities, the expert was asked to provide
the following information.
5. To rate the marginal and conditional prob-
abilities on a discrete scale (0 to 10); and
6. To identify the type of interactive eects of
multiple causal variables on eect variables. For
example, whether each causal variable aects the
eect variable independently (noisy-OR model), or
whether each causal variable aect the eect vari-
ables through interactions of two or more vari-
ables (noisy-AND), or some combination of the
two (Henrion, 1989; Pradhan et al., 1994).
Making inferences. We used Netica [www.nor-
sys.com] to make probabilistic inferences using
both sum propagation and max propagation.
Sum propagation. The sum propagation com-
putes the marginal probabilities of all the model
variables and updates the marginals with all ad-
ditional evidence received about other variables.
In our case study, we can evaluate each product
decision option under dierent scenarios. The
scenarios were de®ned in consultation with three
marketing experts (including the subject), and they
represent situations in which there are unambigu-
ous prescriptions for product decisions in the
marketing literature. We illustrate how predictions
can be made about our subjectÕs perceptions of
product option 1 (risk free proposition) in terms of
ÔgoÕ or Ôno goÕ under dierent information condi-
tions. The same procedure can be used to evaluate
product options 2 and 3. Product option 1 is to
continue with the current product line and is a
risk-free proposition with stable expected pro®ts.
This option can be represented by specifying the
states of two variables in the Bayesian causal map:
Initial Investment low, and Production De-
lay no delay. Since the product is similar to the
one already being marketed, the initial cost of
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development and commercialization is minimal.
Similarly, the chance of delay in production due to
development problems is also very low. Table 2
shows the prior marginal probabilities of the three
variables directly aecting product decision when
all other variables (except Initial Investment and
Production Delay) in the map are unknown. The
marginal probabilities of these variables are as
Table 2
Prior and posterior marginal probabilities under two dierent scenarios




1. Rate of Product Launch:
High 0.70 0.15 0.80
Low 0.30 0.85 0.20
2. Willingness to Take Risk:
High 0.66 0.13 0.83
Low 0.34 0.87 0.17
3. Sales Projection:
High sale high risk 0.49 0.32 0.41
Low sale low risk 0.51 0.68 0.59
4. Product Option 1c:
Go 0.51 0.63 0.44
No go 0.49 0.37 0.56
a Scenario 1: Market Share Distribution low share, Competitive Strategy cost-eciency, Market Leadership follower and
R&D  low.
b Scenario 2: Market Share Distribution high share, Competitive Strategy cost-eciency, Market Leadership leader and
R&D  high.
c Product Option 1: Production Delayno delay, and Initial Investment low.
Fig. 8. The ®nal bayesian causal map of the product development decision.
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follows. Rate of Product Launch: high 0.70,
low 0.30; Willingness to Take Risk: high 0.66
and low 0.34; Sales Projection: high sale high
risk 0.49, low sale low risk 0.51; Product De-
cision: go 0.51, no go 0.49. Since the industry
speci®ed in the decision case is the computer in-
dustry in which market dynamics are high, the
priors show that any company in the industry
would be willing to take risk and have a high rate
of product launch. However, if we have additional
information about speci®c ®rm characteristics,
then our inferences about Product Decision may
change.
We specify two dierent scenarios and show
how our inferences about product decision option
one change depending on the ®rm factors. In the
®rst scenario, we consider a struggling ®rm with a
low market share that follows a price-based
strategy. Accordingly we specify the states of the
following four ®rm variables in the map: Market
Share Distribution low, Competitive Strategy 
cost-eciency, Market Leadership follower, and
R&D low. Based on this information, we prop-
agate the information to compute the posterior
marginals of variables of interest. A comparison of
prior and posterior marginals of Rate of Product
Launch, Willingness to Take Risk, Sales Projec-
tion and Product Decision is shown in Table 2.
When additional information is received about
®rm factors, the posterior probability of Rate of
Product Launch low increases from 0.30 to 0.85,
that of Willingness to Take Risk low increases
from 0.37 to 0.87 and that of Sales Projec-
tion low sale low risk increases from 0.51 to 0.68.
These posterior marginals change our inference
about the state of Product Decision. The posterior
probability of ÔgoÕ for product option 1 is 0.63 in
comparison to a prior of 0.51. Under the condi-
tions described in scenario 1, our marketing expert
is likely to select product option 1 since the ®rm
factors make him/her risk averse.
In the second scenario, we consider a market-
leading ®rm with a high market share and that
follows a technology-based strategy. Accordingly,
the states of the four ®rm variables in the map are
speci®ed as follows: Market Share Distribu-
tion high share, Competitive Strategy innova-
tion, Market Leadership leader and R&D yes.
As shown in Table 2, the posterior marginal of
Rate of Product Launch high increases from
0.70 to 0.80, that of Willingness to Take
Risk high increases from 0.66 to 0.83, and that
of Sales Projection low sale low risk increases
from 0.51 to 0.59. The posterior marginal proba-
bility of Product Decision no go increases from
0.50 to 0.56. This implies that in scenario two, our
marketing expert is more likely to reject Product
Option 1.
A relevant question is which product option
will our marketing expert choose in the second
scenario. To ®nd an answer to this question, we
evaluated both product options two and three
following the procedure described above. The re-
sults show that the highest probability of ÔgoÕ in
scenario two is for Product Option 3. Product
Option 3 can be described in the map by specifying
Initial Investment high and Delay in Produc-
tion high. This increases the probability of Sales
Projection high sale high risk to 0.56, whereas
the probabilities of Willingness to Take Risk and
Rate of Product Launch remain the same. The
posterior marginal probability of Product Option
3 go is 0.62. This implies that in scenario two,
our subject is more likely to go for a high sale high
risk proposition such as Product Option 3 since he/
she has an organizational infrastructure which al-
lows him/her to take risk in order to go for a new
product with potentially very high sales.
Max propagation. The max propagation com-
putes the most likely con®guration of the states of
model variables under dierent scenarios. This is
useful in getting a macro picture of the situation.
We illustrate max propagation for Product Option
1 (risk free proposition with stable pro®ts) under
the same two scenarios described in the section on
sum propagation. Table 3 shows the most likely
con®guration of the variables when all variables
(except Initial Investment low and Production
Delay no delay) are unknown. However, when
we specify Scenario 1, the most likely con®gura-
tion of the variables changes. The most likely state
of Rate of Product Launch changes from high to
low, that of prior presence in the market changes
from yes to no, that of Sales Uncertainty changes
from high to low. The most likely states of all the
three decision variables change: Willingness to
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Take Risk changes from high to low, Product
Pricing from high to low and Product Decision
Option one changes from no go to go. This change
in the states of the ®rm variables and product
characteristics help us explain why the state of
Product Option 1 changes from no go to go. When
Scenario 2 is speci®ed, the most likely con®gura-
tion of the variables changes and the Product
Option 1 changes to no go. The change in the
con®guration is shown in Table 3. The pattern of
change in the con®guration of the map helps us
understand how and why the overall decision
changes when ®rm characteristics change.
Making inferences using sum and max propa-
gation is useful in predicting decision outcomes as
well as in evaluating and analyzing decision factors
that may have aected speci®c decision outcomes.
6. Summary and conclusions
The main goal of this paper is to propose a
formal procedure for making inferences in causal
maps using the Bayesian network approach. Ac-
cordingly, we describe a new graphical structure
called Bayesian causal maps. Bayesian causal
maps combine the strengths of causal maps and
Bayesian networks and reduce the limitations of
both. Using concepts from the literature on causal
modeling and logic, Bayesian causal maps clarify
the cause±eect relations depicted in the causal
maps. They depict dependence between variables
based on causal mapping approach (D-map) as
well as a lack of dependence between variables
based on the Bayesian network approach (I-map).
A Bayesian causal map is therefore a perfect map.
Bayesian causal maps consider the reasoning (de-
ductive versus abductive) underlying the cause±
eect relations perceived by individuals. This
strengthens the validity of the direction of causal
relations represented in the map. Bayesian causal
maps provide a framework for representing the
uncertainty of variables in the map as well as the
eect of variables not modeled in the map. Using
evidence propagation algorithms, Bayesian causal
maps allow us to make inferences about the vari-
Table 3
Most likely con®guration of variables under two dierent scenarios
Variables Prior model Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Industry variables:
1. Market Dynamics High High High
2. Product Life Cycle Short Short Short
3. Market Share Distribution High share Low share High share
Firm variables:
4. Competitive Strategy Technology-based Price based Technology-based
5. Brand Loyalty High High High
6. Market Leadership Leader Follower Leader
7. Cross Functional Teams Yes No Yes
8. R&D High Low High
9. Rate of Product Launch High Low High
10. Prior Presence in the Market Yes No Yes
Product variables:
11. Sales Uncertainty High Low High
12. Production Delay No delay No delay No delay
13. Initial Investment Low Low Low
14. Product Risk Low Low Low
15. Sales Projection Low sale low risk Low sale low risk Low sale low risk
Decision variables:
16. Willingness to Take Risk High Low High
17. Product Pricing High Low High
18. Product Decision No go Go No go
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ables in the map. Finally, using a case study, we
have illustrated how Bayesian causal maps can be
constructed starting from a causal map, and how it
can be used to make inferences.
There are some interesting implications of our
study. First, constructing Bayesian networks has
been a big bottleneck in knowledge engineering
(Henrion, 1989; Pradhan et al., 1994; Laskey and
Mahoney, 1997). If our procedure is tested and
re®ned, it could be used as a basis for constructing
Bayesian networks based on an expertÕs knowl-
edge. Second, most of the emphasis in causal maps
has been in its use for knowledge representation.
This study enables decision-makers to use causal
maps for decision making. In¯uence diagrams
proposed by Howard and Matheson (1981) use
Bayesian network models of uncertainty in addi-
tion to decision nodes, utility functions, and in-
formation constraints. Thus, Bayesian causal
maps can be use for normative decision making
using the framework of in¯uence diagrams.
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